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Abstract
In my answer to Ernst von Glasersfeld's (2008) question "Who conceives Society?" I proposed a radically
social constructivism (Krippendorff, 2008a) that overcomes what I perceive to be an unfortunate cognitivism
in von Glasersfeld's, Heinz von Foerster's, and Humberto Maturana's work. Since then, I published two other
papers on the subject. One (2008b) moves the notion of human agency into the center of my project, focusing
on its role in conceptions of social organizations - a concept less grand than "society" and one (2008c) teases
out several reflexive turns that have grown in cybernetics but cannot be subsumed by the epistemology of
radical constructivism and second-order cybernetics, which privileges observation and a representational
theory of language over participation in conversation and cooperative constructions of reality. In all of these
efforts, conversation has become the starting point of my conceptualizations of being human. In this essay, I
wish to discuss what conversation entails, how it is maintained, and under which conditions it degenerates
into something else.
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Introduction 
In my answer to Ernst von Glasersfeld's (2008) question "Who conceives 
Society?" I proposed a radically social constructivism (Krippendorff, 2008a) 
that overcomes what I perceive to be an unfortunate cognitivism in von 
Glasersfeld's, Heinz von Foerster's, and· Humberto Maturana's work. Since 
then, I published two other papers on the subject. One (2008b) moves the 
notion of human agency into the center of my project, focusing on its role in 
conceptions of social organizations- a concept less grand than "society" and 
one (2008c) teases out several reflexive turns that have grown in cybernetics 
but cannot be subsumed by the epistemology of radical constructivism and 
second-order cybernetics, which privileges observation and a representational 
theory of language over participation in conversation and cooperative 
constructions of reality. In all of these efforts, conversation has become the 
starting point of my conceptualizations of being human. In this essay, I wish to 
discuss what conversation entails, how it is maintained, and under which 
conditions it degenerates into something else. 
Since Martin Heidegger, many philosophers have based their work on 
the contention that humans live in language. I concur with this proposition but 
must warn that there are several' conceptions of language (Volosinov, 1986) 
and it is important to be clear about the specific conception of language when 
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subscribing to such a proposition. Linguistic conceptions of language are 
largely due to Ferdinand de Saussure's (1916) unfortunate but consequential 
distinction between "langue" and "parole." For him, langue, the French for 
language, is the relatively enduring system of rules and conventions common 
to all of its speakers, and parole, the French for speaking, is what speakers do 
with language. The latter is considered full of idiosyncrasies, marred by 
individual incompetencies, entirely situational, messy, difficult to study, and 
hence excluded from the object that linguistics constructs and calls language. 
Also, for Saussure, langue and parole is what individuals speak. The fact that 
we speak in the expectation of being understood by others, in social relations 
with others, not merely expressing our experiences to the world - inter-
individual relations - does not enter traditional linguistic inquiries, socio-
linguistics nudging excepted. In my view, linguists study a convenient 
abstraction from processes of conversations, purporting to be the systematic 
and conventional structure that governs individual speakers. It construes that 
abstraction as the government of individual speech. 
For me, Maturana and Francisco Varela's (1980, 1987) term 
"languaging" or "the use of language" brings the linguist abstraction back to 
where it is embodied, in real people speaking with each other. Languaging is a 
process of mutual human engagement. It' is not just a biological capability. 
Languaging has a history, developmentally, in the sense that individual humans 
learn it from each other, etymologically in the sense that spoken utterances 
and written words have lineages that go back to generations of uses by largely 
unrecognized cultural ancestors, and ontogenetically, in the sense that it goes 
hand in glove with-the evolution and use of cultural artifacts. Languaging is a 
social or inter-personal phenomenon, not a cognitive one. 
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For Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953; Schulte, 1992), language is a game we play 
with each other, and the meaning of its words is the history of acquiring their 
use. When we learn a language, we learn to coordinate ourselves with present 
others. This is quite consistent with Maturana's (1988) conception of language 
as the con-sensual coordination of con-sensual coordinations of actions. The 
dash between "con" and "sensual" is mine and intended to highlight the jointly 
sensing of (focusing on) something and each other by speakers, and to prevent 
the common reading of "consensual" as relating to consensus or agreement. 
Playing soccer, for example, requires much coordination among players 
relative to a moving ball. But what makes handling that ball a soccer game has 
much to do with the interpretation of written rules, for example, by referees, 
declaring something to be a violation or a scored goal, and which team won. 
I contend that Wittgenstein's choice of the game metaphor may not 
have been an entirely happy one as it suggests language as a means of 
accomplishing something, a tool, for example, to decide who won the game. 
Surely, this is not what he implied. Rather, his language games do not need to 
be finite and may well be ongoing, a "way of life" in which people have the 
courage to change their being with each other. I have similar misgiving with 
the idea of language as the coordination of coordinations of actions. Language 
does not control anything. Speakers interface with each other and define 
themselves interactively, not as individual actors, but as participants, acting 
jointly (Shatter, 1993). Even in a soccer game, not all participants are eager to 
be on the winning side of the game. Besides the two teams of players, 
including their coaches, there are referees, sports enthusiasts, field owners, 
and their employees whose diverse realities are necessary but not questioned 
during a game. As Wittgenstein reminds us, using language does something. In 
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the process of speaking, realities are cooperatively created and maintained in 
which speakers constitutively participate in relation to each other. Human 
relations, soccer games, cities, and technologies are interactive 
accomplishments, cognition playing always only a part in them. What 
individual soccer players have in mind may well affect the outcome of the 
game but does not determine its end. 
In (2008c), I worked towards the conclusion that cybernetics is an 
interdisciplinary discourse that brings radically reflexive realities into being, 
which includes attention to a host of familiar constructions from feedback 
loops, self-references, recursions, autonomies, to its own constructive use of 
language. There I suggested that second-order cyberneticians do not go far 
enough when they merely reflect on their observations, taking responsibility 
for observing, constructing realities, and describing that process to others. The 
idea that observers observe their observations abstracts individual capabilities 
from the fabric of conversations in which observations become inter-
individually meaningful and constructions of reality become coordinated 
among interlocutors. I am suggesting that the realities we say we see or think 
we know are not mere cognitive constructions, they become intelligible and 
are continually shaped in conversations. The point is that words do something 
(Austin, 1962), organizations are performed in conversations (Krippendorff, 
2008b), and theories can change the very world they claim to describe, right in 
front of their speakers' eyes (Krippendorff, 2009:112-130) with reality 
conforming to or running away from the unreflected belief in its 
representation in language. 
For this reason, I prefer not to ground my argument in radical 
constructivist conception of reality as cognitive construction, nor in its 
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objectivist counterpart, that physical or biological reality affords (explains) our 
perception. To me, physicists construct a universe for the sole convenience of 
getting answers to their questions (Werner Heisenberg: "What we observe is 
not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning"). Physics 
becomes foundational when insisting that the reality it constructs underlies 
everything else. Similarly, biology becomes foundational when claiming that 
the living systems that biologists construct underlie all human sciences. 
Foundationalisms are often maintained by denying the discourses in which 
they are claimed. All Questions and answers, truth claims, theories, and 
conceptions are articulated in conversations and not realizing them as 
arguments or claims diverts attention from how realities are socially 
constructed to what results from that process, from what we humans create to 
what we dare not to question. The conception of causality, for example, the 
backbone of physical explanations, has no place for human agency. The 
conception of autopoiesis, basic to biology, is entirely optional to how beings 
organize their lives. Finally, cognitive autonomy, which underlies radical 
constructivists' explanations of human cognitive abilities, is an 
epiphenomenon of conversations and other forms of interaction. Cognitive 
phenomena cannot be observed, least of all located in someone's brain. They 
become manifest in institutionalized vocabularies that psychological 
experimenters can elicit from their subjects - experiences, understandings, 
conceptual models, intentions, and other individual abilities - omitting the 
essentially linguistic, social, interactive, embodied, and ongoing nature of the 
· situation in which data emerge as co-constructed. 
In his paper "Producing a Cognition", Charles Antaki (2006) gives a good 
example of an interview that is designed to test the cognitive ability of 
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respondents. It starts with an interviewee's denial to know where his money 
comes from. But after interacting with the interviewer, the interviewee ends 
up realizing or constructing an answer that satisfied both the interviewer and 
the respondent. It demonstrates conclusively that cognition is co·nstructed 
interactively and in language. Here, cognitio'n is housed neither in the mind of 
the interviewee nor in that of the interviewer. 
I am suggesting that all sciences are practiced in constrained 
conversations, in discourse as I will detail below. They create and rearticulate 
their objects so as to be observable and interpretable within their respective 
discourse communities. Contrary to convenient but questionable beliefs that 
their objects precede attention to them, I contend that the realities the 
sciences describe are the artifacts of constrained conversational practices by 
their communities. Almost everything we think we know, plan, build, and use 
emerges from disciplined verbal and non-verbal interactions. 
It makes sense, therefore, to ground this essay in where questions are 
asked, truth claims are negotiated, and realities are co-constructed, that is, in 
conversations. This is where physical, biological, cognitive, linguistic and 
sociological realities are created and take hold of the imaginations of diverse 
communities whose members listen to, live with, and enact these 
conversational realities. I am assuming that we humans, like all animals, are 
constituted in togetherness as a condition of our existence, not in biological or 
cognitive functioning. For some species, togetherness is short lived, consisting 
of coincidental coupling, birthing, and temporal caring. For us, humans, 
togetherness is richer. It involves interactively coordinated speaking during 
which we are consta·ntly reminded that our engagement with each other has a 
history that precedes our participation in it and this history inevitably 
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resonates in ongoing conversations. Conversation is one explanation that 
constitutes itself in practicing human togetherness. 
The following two sections describe conversation from two contrasting 
positions. The first applies von Foerster and Maturana's variously articulated 
conception of a standard scientific observer (here of conversation) whose aim 
is to be conscious of his or her acts of observing and describing his or her 
observations/constructions to others. The second takes the position of a 
participant in conversations whose competencies reside in contributing to 
what is happening there. The difference between these two positions is not 
found in the difference between objective and subjective accounts of the same 
phenomena but between outsider and insider accounts. All accounts occur in 
conversations and are offered in the first position by one observer (of 
conversations) to a community of other observers, and in the second position 
by participants in the very process to be accounted for. I am using the second 
section not only as a critique of the first, showing the epistemological 
limitations of celebrating observers and observations, but also as a reference 
to what happens when conversation degenerates into something else. 
Conversation observed 
Morphologically, "con-" means together, joint, or among, and "-versation" has 
many roots, from making "verse" out of experiences as poets do, being 
"conversant" in a subject matter, to a "version," translation or interpretation 
of something, including of reality. The Oxford English Dictionary (1991:868) 
traces "Conversation" to the 1ih century and gives its earliest meaning as "The 
action of living or having one's being in a place of or among persons" and "The 
action of consorting or having dealings with others; living together; commerce, 
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intercourse, society, intimacy. In the 16th century conversation became 
"Interchange of thoughts and words; familiar discourse or talk." This 
etymology suggests the meaning of conversation to be remarkably stable. Its 
overriding use is a way of being together in talk and interaction serves me well. 
Contrasting dialogue with writing, I suggested: Everything said is said in the 
" expectation of being understood by an addressee. Everything heard as being 
said is taken as having been said by one person to another. Unde~standing 
does not need to be mutual and shared, but to be complementary in how it is 
performed (Krippendorff, 2009:159). Minimally, conversation requires two 
participants in interlacing expectations. Charles Goodwin (1981:4), citing Erving 
Goffman (1976), differentiates three listeners to talk. Those who overhear a 
conversation without being part of it and without the expectation or ability to 
respond, those who are part of a conversation and (in case of three or more 
participants) are addressed by the speaker and expected to respond, or not 
addressed and not expected to respond. Goffman and Goodwin thought of 
overhearers as casual bystanders. I am including as bystanders the observers 
of conversations, for example, through a one-way mirror, the listeners of wire 
tapped telephone conversations, the viewers of verbal interactions on a movie 
screen, and, most important here, the conversation analysts, typically working 
from transcripts of naturally occurring talk. The latter are scientific observers 
of conversation and I maintain their view is necessarily unlike the view of 
involved participants. 
As a scientific observer, overhearing and recording conversations from 
their outside, Robert Nofsinger (1991) considers conversations as: 
• Mundane activities among those observed together. Everyone is able to 
engage in conversation with others without specialized knowledge, 
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preparation or equipment. This observation may need to be qualified by 
noting that conversation is learned. Mothers incessantly talk to their 
babies, initially pleased to get at least a smile in response. It is not clear 
how babies or children listen, but in time, their participation becomes 
richer and entirely natural or mundane. Then Nofsinger's observation 
applies. 
Common occurrences. Conversations are observed everywhere, at home, 
at work, while shopping, in public places, on the telephone, and between 
waking up in the morning and exchanging intimacies with a partner at 
night. While mostly taking place among acquaintances, conversations also 
occur among strangers as when waiting in line for a cashier or in a doctor's 
office. 
• Interactively unfolding in time. Participants take turns and respond to each 
other's utterances. A conversation essentially is a sequential activity. It 
creates its own history. This history can be recorded, videotaped, 
transcribed, and examined in detail, providing analyzable data. 
• Locally managed. During the course of a conversation, participants 
themselves determine who speaks, how long, and in which order. 
Responsibility for maintaining a conversation is distributed among those 
present. 
• Accompanied by other activities. Participants are not merely saying 
something to each other when they talk. They are also doing something at 
the same time. Activities may include non-verbal expressions - gestures, 
eye contact variations in voice - but they also establish relationships 
among speakers and coordinate parallel activities. Conversations between 
the pilot and copilot direct an airplane's flight; within a team of designers 
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result in a novel technology; between therapist and a client produce new 
realities, ostensively for the client but in fact for both; among business 
partners shape actionable agreements; or among the employees of a social 
organization determine what that organization is and how everyone 
contributes to it. Conversations coordinate the realities of everyday life. 
Other scholars consider conversations as: 
• Extendable to mediated activities. Although speaking a language is 
acquired in bodily presence of others in conversation, once learned, 
conversations can continue through interactive media, between 
participants out of sight. Exchanging written letters, once the only form of 
mediated conversation, is being replaced by telephone conversations, 
online discussions, email, and texting. While all mediated conversations 
omit some features of face-to face conversations - sight in telephone 
conversations, identity in some text-based internet discussions - they 
always extend desirable dimensions - distance. Yet, in mediated 
conversations, participants are aware of each other. 
Academic interests in conversations assume conversations to be 
• Analyzab/e and theorizable, usually from recordings and transcripts that 
allow the conversation analyst to examine and reexamine the data for 
patterns that may otherwise escape even the most attentive listening, or 
in the case of mediated conversations, casual reading. 
Theories based on such data always are and cannot be anything other than the 
theories of observers, not of the observed participants - unless the latter 
articulate their theory in use, which is rare. However, the position of observers 
and participants should not be confused on epistemological grounds. Also, 
theories always reflect the disciplinary interests of theorists in a limited aspect 
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of the available data. For example, therapists typically look for clues to a 
diagnosis of their clients' mental problems, ignoring everything else, including 
their own creative contributions to this end. Employers may examine interview 
data to predict whether an interviewee will fit their job description, and 
cognitive scientists select from the verbal interactions what allows them to 
infer what is going on in participants' mind. Conversation analysts are not 
immune to such limitations either when seeking to invent rules that could 
explain the organization of talk and exchange of written messages, except that 
their theories tend not to aim at generalizations but are satisfied with 
moment-to-moment explanations. 
It is often taken for granted that conversation analysts can hardly 
proceed without speaking the language of the participants in observed 
conversations, nor can they succeed without conversational experiences on 
their own. Even the transcripts they prepare are cultural artifacts that speak to 
the analysts' competencies to engage in and write down what they observe. 
Reliance on such data questions the detachment that conversation analysts 
seek to project in their analyses and explanations. 
Insightful analysts may well have been part of the very conversations 
they subsequently analyze. Goodwin (1981), for example, taped many birthday 
parties and gatherings among friends, bringing insider experiences into his 
analysis. But being compelled to demonstrate the validity of a conversation 
analysis in terms of quotes from transcripts or clips from video recordings 
encourages explanations of sequential interactions, turn taking, and how 
categories of utterances follow each other. Such sequential data lead some 
analysts to causal explanations, for example, John Searle (1969) and other 
speech act theorists invoke "illocutionary forces" to explain what speech acts 
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do, or Gordon Pask (1975, 1976) relies on computational explanations of 
conversations. Such explanations make sense from the position of an observer 
who has no direct access to the choices that participants exercise and what 
motivated them. All they can work from is how observations follow each other. 
While acknowledging local management as a defining.feature of conversations, 
what conversation analysts easily overlook is their inability to account for what 
is happening inside conversations. Self-organizing systems, by definition, 
develop their own identities, their own realities, and their own meanings for 
what occurs within their boundaries. For outsiders, it is extraordinarily difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to explain why participants say what they say and how a 
conversation is developing the way it does, except for the above mentioned 
possibility of asking questions of the participants, in effect intervening in the 
conversation of interest, thus bringing their own conversational experiences 
into the very conversation to be analyzed. 
By analyzing transcripts of conversations, conversation analysts notice 
patterns that may mean nothing to participants inside conversations. To claim 
that participants in conversation are unaware of the patterns that 
conversation analysts are "discovering," or more correctly said, "constructing," 
is epistemologically untenable- unless analysts step out of their observer role, 
explore their hypotheses with the participants in a conversation, and thus 
become conversationally involved, abandoning their preferred observer role. 
In the social sciences, participant accounts largely are considered unreliable 
and not born out by observational facts. Preservation of objectivity was one 
reason for linguistics to exclude parole and conversations from their object of 
study. Conversation analysts are not committed to the abstract-objectivist 
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notions of language (Volosinov, 1986) that linguists pursue but also shy away 
from becoming conversationally involved in their object of analysis. 
To appreciate the severe limitations of understanding conversations by 
overhearing or observing conversations from their outside, let me now 
describe, to the extent possible, conversation from within the process, as a 
participant. 
Authentic conversation 
In existential philosophy, authenticity has to do with being true to one's self 
despite pressures of society to be otherwise. There, authenticity is celebrated 
as an individualist ideal that denies the conversational reality of being human. I 
am using authenticity here to refer to a pleasure of participating in 
togetherness in which one is free to speak for oneself, not in the name of 
absent others, not under pressure to say things one does not believe in, and 
not having to hide something for fear of being reprimanded or excluded from 
further conversations. But I will be more specific than that. 
Authentic conversation is not easily if at all identifiable from its outside. 
How would an observer access someone's construction in progress, why 
something is said, and what is not being said? Questions of this kind should not 
be dismissed as being subjective. Inasmuch as participants in conversations can 
be asked and may be willing to account for their feelings, the act of making 
them public where they can be dealt with in the very conversations that elicits 
them, renders them inter-subjectively verifiable. One is reminded of 
Wittgenstein's argument against private language. Participant accounts are not 
only richer in meaning and closer to what is going on inside a conversation 
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than their observational manifestations, but also more predictable of how a 
conversation unfolds- at least to the satisfaction of the participants. 
Participants in authentic conversations - whether as speakers or 
listeners, and in case of the latter, whether addressed and expected to 
respond or waiting for their turn- may experience conversations as: 
• Occurring in the presence of addressable and responsive individuals. In 
authentic conversations, participants distinguish themselves and each 
other by the contributions they make to them. The act of distinguishing 
oneself is public. It does not impose identities on others, which is what 
observers are destined to do. When participants cannot be seen as 
addressable or the source of their voices cannot be distinguished, for 
example, when in a large and anonymous crowd, conversation is no longer 
authentic. 
• Maintaining mutual understanding. In conversations, mutuality, 
agreement, and coordination of understanding and acting are of central 
concern for all participants. However, since cognition cannot be observed 
and nobody can compare their own understanding with that of others, in 
conversations, understanding or the lack of it, is performative and evident 
in certain speech acts, such as "I understand", "I agree" or "tell me more". 
Here, understanding does not mean similarity or sharing, its affirmation 
constitutes an invitation to go on, including to other subjects. 
Observers, by contrast, are effectively excluded from the possibilities of 
checking their understanding of what they overhear against the performative 
understanding among participants in conversation. In this respect, analysts of 
transcripts of conversations or written exchanges are literally 'out of the loop', 
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isolated, and responsive at most to their scientific community of equally 
detached observers. 
• Self-organizing and constituted in the contributions their participants make 
to each other. Conversations are communicationally closed. They are not 
abstracted from anything. They are embodied in real participants' talking 
and listening to each other, responding to what they heard, and acting 
accordingly. The identities of conversations - dinner conversations, 
political deliberations in a convenient place, therapeutic sessions, focus 
group discussions, business meeting, or design projects - emerges from 
talk and text generated within that conversation. With the emergence of 
conversational identities comes the feeling of being part of it, referring to 
its participants by the inclusive "we." How the responsibility to maintain 
the flow of conversational moves is distributed among participants and the 
direction in which a conversation is going is always uncertain - save for 
one's own contribution. Among participants, this uncertainty is not a 
deficiency, however. Participants trust each other to make sense of what is 
said. 
Observers who seek to understand a conversation from a recording of what 
happened, looking at it from a God's eye view, cannot possibly appreciate the 
feeling of being part of it, the feeling of being able to shape an always evolving 
conversation, and the feeling of trusting each other to maintain the flow. As 
Michael Billig (2006) noted, we have a rich vocabulary of inner processes -
feelings, thoughts, attitudes, experiences, memories, and reasons- in terms of 
which psychologists construct the cognitive processes of their interest without 
being observable. However, it is because the conversational use of these 
words is public and coordinated with other speakers of a language that they 
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become meaningful in conversations, not as description of individual states but 
as performing certain speech acts. 
• Intuitive,. not rule governed. Authentic conversations are embodied 
practices. Turn taking, topic switching, coordination of reality 
constructions is natural, requiring no reflection, no preparation, no special 
training - as Nofsinger said, notwithstanding the fact that children, born 
into a community, need to learn joining its conversations. Children do not 
learn rules, however; and then apply them. They learn to interact with ,. 
others by speaking much like how they see and hear others interact with 
them. Authentic conversations do not follow rules, they give birth to 
further conversations. Only after sufficient conversational competencies 
are acquired is it possible to talk of improper practices - "do not 
interrupt", "don't be rude" or "listen!" from which conversational 
conventions may emerge. But authentic conversations may go on without 
them. 
Conversation theorists may well draw useful distinctions in the transcripts of 
conversations, for example, by analyzing conversational triples and adjacency 
pairs, formulating and testing hypotheses about how natural conversations are 
organized (Goodwin, 1981), postulating conversational maxims (Grice, 1975, 
1978), or theorizing a universal pragmatics for ideal speech situations 
(Habermas, 1970, 2001), but all of these grand theoretical precepts are the 
constructions by and for outsiders of conversations. 
Conversation analysts have the tendency of claiming that participants 
implicitly follow the rules they have invented. This claim is epistemologically 
preposterous, however. Drawing on Sigmund Freud, Billig (2006) makes a 
useful distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious. The former 
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is an observer's construction of cognition that is inaccessible to an observed 
individual (and often related to repression). The latter is an observer's 
construction of what that individual does not attend to at the moment, takes 
for granted while conversing with others. But from the perspective of social 
construction, there is also the possibility that conversation analytic 
vocabularies enter a conversation and start coordinating participants' talk 
whether of cognitive conditions or conversational rules. In other words, while 
the results of conversation analysis may not have anything to do with how 
conversation is practiced, teaching conversation theoretical explanations may 
divert practitioners' attention from what they had been doing naturally. 
• Dialogically equal. By dialogical equality I mean that every participant in a 
conversation has the possibility of contributing to it. Nobody feels 
excluded. Every contribution, even silence, is respected and appropriately 
responded to. 
Indeed, participation is rarely observed equal. Some participants inevitably 
speak more than others do, leading to the claim of power inequalities 
operating within observed conversation. Moreover, participants usually have 
unequal resources (experiences) to contribute. Turn taking is inherently 
asymmetrical. However, interpretations of observed differences in frequencies 
as indicators of inequality may not be valid to insiders to whom unequal 
experiences may not be detrimental to authentic conversations, more likely, 
but a way to keep a conversation alive. Even without making an observable 
contribution, the perception of being able to contribute when the opportunity 
arises and be accepted for what one says is all that matters. Needless to say 
dialogical equality is not observable from outside a conversation. Participants 
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may not speak about its presence either but are most likely notice and 
articulate its absence. 
• Creating possibilities of participation. Conversations may well take place 
while doing a job. But besides correlations with a purposive activity, 
conversations are inherently self-motivating, creative of newness, offering 
participants possibilities to contribute, and realize themselves in the 
contributions they and others make to the process. One obvious example 
of opening possibilities of participation is to raise questions not previously 
answered, inviting addressees to construct mutually acceptable answers. 
Conversational possibilities expand when participants assure each other 
that their contributions are important, being understood, and protective of 
each other's faces (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Creating and maintaining 
possibilities for others, relates to von Foerster's (1981:308) ethical 
imperative: "Act always so as to increase the number of choices." Here, I 
am embedding his imperative in the context of social interactions. Socially 
relevant choices, not their numbers, are the gifts that partners in 
communication can offer each other (Krippendorff, 2009:34). 
Obviously, possibilities can be created, pondered, exhausted, and constrained, 
but not observed. It should also be noted that not all questions may invite 
participation, as I shall discuss below. 
• Irreversible, progressive, and unique. For participants, conversations never 
repeat themselves. Each turn is experienced as unique; each utterance 
reveals its speakers' shifting perspectives. As Heraclitus suggested, "you 
cannot step twice in the same river." Participants have numerous 
conversational moves available to alert each other of redundant threads: 
"here we go again!" "didn't you already tell that story", "old news", etc. 
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Indeed, it makes no sense to repeat stories unless they had been forgotten 
or decisions unless they were not followed up or previously undone. 
For conversation analysts, each transcript may well be unique as well. 
However, scientific analysis calls for the identification of recurrent pattern and 
generalizations at the cost of excluding the very uniqueness to which the 
participants in conversations respond. Observers tend to be blind to the 
unique contributions made in conversations. Participants tend to be blind to 
the repetitions they take for granted. Evidently, observers and participants 
construct realities that are orthogonal to each other but not incompatible. 
• Coordinating constructions of reality. Conversations always leave artifacts 
behind, minimally the memories of their own history. Other artifacts 
include the always evolving relationships among participants. But most 
important are the changes that participants introduce into the world while 
being in and after participating in conversations: decisions with practical 
consequences, institutionalizations of procedures, projects, designs or 
texts, and realizations of diverse technologies. Rarely do these artifacts 
correspond to any one individual's cognition. Participants supplement each 
other's contributions (Gergen, 1994). Indeed, furniture, cars, computers, 
the internet and cities are designed in the course of many conversations, 
having long histories with changing participants but a common thread. 
Conceptions of these artifacts need not be shared and mostly cannot be 
articulated in full by any one individual but may complement each other in 
the interactions that set these artifacts in motion. 
Conversation theorists cannot achieve such coordinations for their theories -
unless they join the conversation they are theorizing and become active 
participants, no longer observers. Similarly, theorists of technology are 
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comfortable in describing the histories of technological developments, but 
rarely appreciate the multiple conversational grounds of such developments, 
much less dare to forecast technological developments. The belief in 
technological determinism is an extreme case of denying the role of language 
and social interaction that drive such developments. 
• Continuable in principle. From the perspective of external observers, 
conversations may be short, such as between occupants of neighboring 
seats on a city bus, which terminate when they no longer sit next to each 
other, or long, such as between teenage friends who talk for hours on the 
telephone. For observers, both examples take place in measurably finite 
time. But for participants, time may not matter but the possibility of their 
continuation at a later time, at a different place, and perhaps including 
new participants, regardless of what happened between separate 
encounters. When children move out of their family, for instance, going to 
college, and stay in touch with their family members and friends by 
telephone, email, or text messaging, they continue to weave the 
conversational realities they had started long ago albeit by different 
means, across geographical distances, and under continuously changing 
circumstances. Conversations can terminate when they degenerate into 
other forms of interactions, incompatible with the above, and in the 
extreme, when violence enters, which is a categorically different way of 
being together. 
Evidently, there are vast differences between how participants see themselves 
in authentic conversations and what outside observers, conversation analysts, 
can record, analyze, ·articulate, and theorize. The two positions are con-
sensually different, distinguished by unlike epistemologies, unlike relationships 
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to their objects of attention, and unlike experiences with the subject matter of 
talk and written exchanges. I am not devaluing the position of conversation 
analyst, but wish to highlight that their reality constructions necessarily differ 
from the realities of those conversationally involved with each other. 
Accountability and possibilities of repairs 
The above depicts conversations as self-organizing and unproblematic verbal 
and non-verbal interactions among participants, constructing coordinated 
realities along the. way. Authentic conversation is typical among trusting 
friends but also among strangers who, having nothing to loose, and feel alive in 
each other's presence. I do not expect participants to describe what authentic 
conversation entails -as I tried above - but become aware when disruptions 
of it are experienced. 
In everyday life, people do not always respond in perfect alignment of 
each other. We say things that may not be understood as intended, interrupt 
someone's turn, offend someone without wanting to, or talk too much and 
thereby preempt others from speaking their mind. Besides such unintended 
disruption of unproblematic interactions, we know of systematic and 
institutionalized disruptions which we may notice when they occur but fail to 
address for a variety of reasons. I maintain that conversational competencies 
include ample possibilities to repair problematic conversations within them. 
Whether or not we utilize these linguistic resources and how aware we are of 
these possibilities is a big question I cannot answer here. Often it is only after 
encountering the efforts of others to repair our conversations with them that 
we become aware ·of their problematic nature and their deviation from 
authentic conversation - without implying the ability to articulate just how a 
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conversation got astray. Possibly the most important linguistic resource for 
repairing disruptions of authentic conversations is accountability. 
I contend that everything said is said not only in the expectation of being 
understood by addressees, but also in the expectation of being held 
accountable for what was said or done. As John Shatter (1984, 1993) suggests, 
speakers tend to articulate their contributions to a conversation not merely in 
response to other speakers but also with possible accounts in mind in case 
their contributions are challenged. The process of holding participants 
accountable may be initiated by noting an infelicitous, untoward, or 
problematic conversational move, action, or sequence of exchanges. 
Expressing dis-ease with someone's contribution - sometimes called meta-
communication- amounts to a momentary disruption of that flow and implies 
a request for an account by the presumed source of that dis-ease. Requests for 
an account may also be made directly: "Why did you say that?" "What do you 
want to accomplish with that proposal? "Why do you come so late?" The 
account subsequently given is then evaluated and either accepted or rejected, 
and in case of the latter, a new account may be requested, until the issue is 
resolved (Buttny, 1993). 
The most typical accounts are explanations, justifications, excuses (Mills, 
1940; Scott & Lyman, 1968), and apologies. The interactions they set in motion 
are part of the conversation. They differ from the unproblematic flow of a 
conversation by focusing on the interaction in question, not on what they 
construct. 
• Explanations are least disruptive of conversations. They respond to 
assertions like "I· don't understand", "I am not following you", and 
questions like "can you clarify?" or "what do you mean by that?" 
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Explanations, once accepted as making sense, have the effect of 
coordinating participants' understanding performatively and bringing a 
conversation back to an unproblematic flow. Good explanations 
rearticulate or expand what had been said in terms compatible to 
listeners' background of understanding. 
• Justifications, acknowledge a speaker's agency in an actual or anticipated 
happening, and respond to expressed doubts in the merit of that 
happening. Justifications may be defensive when responding to challenges 
or preparatory when actions are proposed with the intent to seek 
approval. Often justifications are used to enroll listeners into the speaker's 
project (Krippendorff, 2008b). Once justifications are accepted, 
conversation can proceed to other topics. 
• Excuses, by contrast, deny a speaker's or actor's agency, intention, or 
involvement in what happened and offer grounds for not being responsible 
for it. Typical excuses Cjre appeals to external causes, lack of knowledge, 
accidents, being under the influence of drugs, or having acted on order of a 
superior. The latter may shift blame to someone else, which is a common 
diversion. If accepted, excuses render speakers blameless and enable them 
to continue their participation in the conversation. Excuses rely on 
narratives that are intended to be compelling, not necessarily true. Excuses 
do not change the condition for which they are offered. 
• Apologies admit responsibility for an offensive conversational move or 
action, express regret, and imply the promise not to repeat it in the future. 
Unlike excuses, apologies admit the actor's agency. Accepting an apology 
forgives the perpetrators of offensive conversational moves or actions and 
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is a way to continue the conversation in the hope that the offense will not 
recur. 
Shatter's (1984, 1993) observation that all speakers talk in the expectation of 
being held accountable by listeners for what they say and do, applies to the act 
of giving accounts as well. Accounts too are always articulated in the hope of 
being accepted and only those are offered that have that chance. Although 
accounts may well appeal to general conventions - rationality, common 
benefits, individual values, or established practices - such conventions are 
i . · effective only in the very conversations in which participants are willing to let 
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them stand. Inasmuch as the mutual acceptance of practices of living together 
is a matter of ethics by definition, successful accounts provide narratives that 
participants in conversation consider ethical. Thus, in repairing problematic 
conversations, conversation-specific ethical narratives are proposed, tested, 
and accepted, i.e., narratives that participants can live with and find no reason 
to object to. The ethics that emerges in repaired conversations has two 
remarkable features. It is rarely generalizable to all conversations- effectively 
denying their universality, for example, the universal pragmatics of 
communication proposed by Habermas' (1970)- and it cannot be represented 
by any one observer or participant's cognitive construction. Conversational 
Ethical realities are performed in conversations or interactively constructed. 
Accounts may be personal, "I was angry", informational, "I didn't know 
that", related to efficiency, "this is alii could afford", ethical, "I didn't want to 
hurt her", moral, "everyone does it", pragmatic, "it worked in the past", or 
institutional, "this is the approved procedure." 
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Problematic conversations can be considered repaired when they resume their 
natural flow. However, conversations are not machines that can be fixed by 
replacing defective parts. Successful repairs have the potential of leaving 
memorable residues behind, an awareness of what happened and how it was 
resolved. Such residues may become part of the history of a conversation and 
direct that conversation's future along paths not taken absent prior repairs. 
Therefore, a history of successful repairs holds the seeds of conventional 
accounting practices in terms of which future problematic conversational 
moves may become explained, justified, excused, or apologized for. Thus, 
unless the history of repairs is forgotten, repaired conversation may no longer 
be quite authentic and I would argue this condition to be most common in 
naturally occurring conversations. 
Degeneration of conversation 
While language always provides ample resources for repairing untoward 
conversational moves or actions, this is not to say that all disruptions of the 
flow of interactions are repaired indeed. Not repairing problematic 
conversations is not limited to children who are in the process of developing 
accounting competencies. It applies to competent speakers as well. Failing to 
repair conversations that turned problematic has two important social 
consequences. On the one hand, participants who do not hold each other 
accountable for what they say or do, whether for reasons of expedience or 
fear of reprisals, grant implicit permission to continue the untoward practices, 
which can lead to their tacit legitimization. On the other hand, participants 
who refuse to give adequate accounts when requested of them, claim 
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exceptional privileges in effect, which can lead to the institution of inequalities 
and violate the dialogical equality that authentic conversation requires. 
There may be passable and unfortunate reasons for not practicing 
accountability. Temporarily suspending conversation to get something more 
important accomplished might be considered reasonable - as long as this 
suspension is temporary and mutually consented to. Entrapment of one by 
another - threads of exclusion from a conversation, induction of fear of 
retribution, and exercising authority - is always unfortunate because 
acquiescence inevitably creates burdensome interpersonal relationships that 
are incompatible with authentic conversation. The unwillingness of repairing 
problematic conversations is the root cause of conversations to descend into 
other forms of interaction, as I shall exemplify below. The results of such 
degenerations are the conventional starting point of sociological abstractions 
without adequate reflection on their roots in conversations. 
There are innumerably many ways a conversation can degenerate into 
other forms of social interactions. I can offer only a few examples. 
• Physical constraints. Most benign and not entirely social in nature are 
physical constraints. Conversations become increasingly difficult when 
noise competes with participants' ability to listen to each other's voices, or 
when the number of participants grows too large for speakers to address 
individual participants or to distinguishing individual voices, for example at 
mass rallies, political demonstrations, or public performances. In such 
situations, participants acquire collective identities that divide participants, 
say, into performers and audiences or demonstrators and police. 
• Dialogical inequalities. Most obviously, authentic conversation 
degenerates by tolerating dialogical inequalities. Interruptions of a 
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speaker's turn can happen carelessly, but they also may be part of 
accepted discourse practices. For example, it is well known that men 
interrupt women more often than in reverse. Numerous explanations have 
been suggested, including in terms of a prevailing sense of patriarchy. 
More clearly explainable dialogical inequalities occur at board meetings. 
Authentic conversation among equals disappears as soon as the CEO or a 
person in charge of the meeting enters. Such situations are often explained 
in terms of unequal distribution of power. Power, however, is not what 
superiors have and subordinates lack. It is not measurable by unequal 
access of material resources but manifests itself in the unwillingness to 
hold authorities accountable for what they say or do, and its complement, 
in the refusal to provide accounts when requested (Krippendorff, 
2009:131-155). Power arises when accountability is not exercised and 
subsequent interactions are tolerated. 
Therapists have sometimes been characterized as conversation managers, 
which makes therapy different from conversation. Managing focus groups or 
group discussions, for example, by instructing participants to list their ideas on 
a predefined issue, putting them on public display, and then proceeding to 
group them gives the impression of dialogic equality by granting every 
participant a voice while leaving the moderator in charge of the process. 
Widely practiced in marketing research and used as a qualitative method for 
generating data in the social sciences, such methods elicit information that is 
biased by the management of the group interactions, revealing something very 
different from what people would express in unconstrained conversations. 
• Inauthentic questions. I suggested that asking questions with unknown 
answers creates possibilities for participants to choose their contributions 
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and experience respect when their answers are acknowledged by 
responding to them. But questions may be inauthentic as well. Knowledge 
tests, for example, whether administered in educational settings, aptitude 
tests for hiring employees, or scientific research, are not geared to 
understanding but to establish a respondent's comprehension, the criteria 
for which reside in the questioner. Asking questions for which the answers 
are known is consistent with conceptualizing communication as the 
accurate transmission of information from one mind to another - a 
process that is institutionalized in many educational and administrative 
· situations, which have nothing to do with conversation. 
In public opinion research, interviewees are asked to commit themselves to 
answer an interviewer's questions, and to give up their conversationally 
expected ability to ask questions of their own. In this genre of social research, 
questions are standardized for all interviewees, asked according to a schedule, 
and a prepared set of answers conform to the interest to the sponsors of the 
research. Whatever results from such interviews has less to do with what 
people talk among themselves than with what sponsors want to hear 
(Krippendorff, 2005), a seriously biased investigative technique. Talk show 
hosts on radio or television are notoriously in charge of what counts as 
appropriate to the institutionalized genre they enact. They define the topic, 
ask the questions, interrupt as they see fit, including signaling the audience to 
applaud. Talk show guests tend to go along with these inauthenticities for the 
publicity this affords them on a show. 
• Institutionalized interactions. Mariaelena Bartesaghi (2009a) studying 
therapists' use of. questions during therapeutic sessions, found less obvious 
inauthenticities. The therapeutic use of questions may give clients the 
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impression that the therapist is genuinely interested in their problems, but 
systematically directs the clients' answers to where therapists wants to go 
with them. She defines therapy as institutionalized form of interaction. 
Therapy includes avoiding answering clients' questions, for instance: 
Client: "Why can't I see you on Monday?" Therapist: "That seems to 
disturb you, doesn't it?" (Lakoff, 1990:69). 
• Referring to participants in terms of stereotypical categories. When 
addressing each other or some participants in social categories, for 
example, as a (typical) woman, black, French, gay, mental patient, catholic, 
or consumer, the ensuing interaction is no longer among mutually 
respecting individuals but between social categories in terms of which 
participants are expected to reply (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). It would be 
difficult to hold categories accountable for what their members say and 
do. Similarly, when participants in conversations come to divide 
themselves into opposing camps with ideological, party political, or ethnic 
labels, for example, into progressive and conservative politicians, often 
resulting in the use of plural pronouns- the collective "we" versus "they" 
- communication becomes interactions among publically identified 
collectivities and conversation is at best a wrong metaphor. Party politics 
attest to perfectly reasonable individuals adopting ideological voices. 
Even deliberatively avoiding public stereotypes can degrade authentic 
conversation. John Jackson (2008) explores the unintended consequences of 
political correctness in the United States. By confining the use of racial 
stereotypes to conversations in the privacy of one's home, public discourse 
becomes disingenuous and the realities it constructs schizophrenic, not 
resolving the racial tension that political correctness was thought to alleviate. 
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This phenomenon also exemplifies how the invocation of normative theories 
about proper talk in public can destroy the authenticity of conversation. 
• Institutionalizing realities. Bartesaghi (2009b) identified several strategies 
that therapists apply to establish their authority vis-a-vis their clients. 
Some authority is already presupposed in the very act of clients seeking 
therapeutic advice. But in therapy sessions, this authority needs to be 
realized in talk. Therapeutic authority derives largely from using a 
vocabulary that is institutionalized in therapeutic discourse in which 
therapists claim expertise. Therapists are trained to reframe clients' 
personal narratives in 
psychotherapeutic reality for 
professional terms, constructing 
them that therapists can treat with 
a 
the 
institutional resources they command and clients are lacking. This practice 
renders clients as incompetent narrators of their own world. Bartesaghi 
made three important observations. The therapists she observed managed 
to prevent being held accountable to their clients by hiding behind the 
professional community of therapists, referring to themselves in terms of 
the collective "we," having "years of experiences," and professional 
affiliations. That community is physically absent from the therapeutic 
session, channeled into the conversation by the therapist, giving the client 
no chance to address it. By applying institutionally established therapeutic 
theories to the social life of clients - theories of the clients' mental and 
emotional states they are not expected to know - client accounts are 
rendered flawed. This gives therapists the justification to replace clients' 
narratives, feelings, and social problems by institutional accounts that 
enable treatment·as individuals by therapeutic means. 
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Therapeutic discourse is not the only discourse that constructs institutional 
realities clients are asked to accept on the therapists' authority and with their 
help. Scientists too tend to claim possession of the instruments for establishing 
objective reality that laypersons need to accept on account of the scientific 
authority articulating its truths. Teachers assume their authority vis-a-vis their 
students by claiming to have valuable knowledge that students need to 
acquire. Literary scholars presume the ability to interpret texts in ways 
untrained readers cannot and authors may not be aware of. For example, Paul 
Ricoeur's (1970) 'hermeneutic of suspicion' insists on characterizing authors as 
hiding their agenda behind their writing, which has given literary scholars the 
professional license to construct what could underlie a text regardless of what 
its author say it means. In effect, this scholarship thrives on institutionalizing 
what has been called conspiracy theory. It permits.scholars not to listen how 
others - readers and authors - interpret the text they are analyzing. 
Conspirators must, by definition, deny being one. It follows that an author's 
denial of the suspected intentions can be interpreted as evidence for the 
validity of the suspicion - a cognitive trap. One cannot converse with 
institutionalized realities, only with people willing to consider them as mere 
hypotheses, which is what social constructivism advocates. 
Not confining accountability to those present in conversations is a premise of 
sociological theorizing. Besides what I mentioned above, there are at least 
three ways this can happen and it would be important to recognize the 
linguistic ground, as Habermas (2001) does, making sociology possible. 
• Speaking for absent others. When therapists rearticulate their client's 
stories in therapeutic terms, therapists and clients are at least co-present. 
It is conceivable, therefore, that they could hold each other accountable 
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should the evolving conversation go astray. Even institutionalized realities 
can be contested, although I am told that clients in therapy rarely ever do 
this in their sessions, which is not to rule out the possibility of expressing 
their misgivings in conversations with trusted friends. However, when 
speaking for absent others, speakers usurp the voices of individuals who, 
perhaps conveniently excluded from a conversation, can neither be 
questioned within that conversation nor be held accountable for their 
views as channeled into a conversation by one participant. Noble intents 
notwithstanding, speaking for the poor, oppressed, minorities, victims of 
crime, or even for familiar acquaintances is a discourse strategy in Which 
speakers claim to have more voices than their own. When compellingly 
asserted, this gives speakers rhetorical strengths over those who cannot 
claim such backing. Reporting rumors or something overheard may not 
weigh much, but claiming to speak for one's boss during a contentious 
meeting can converts a conversation among equals into a game of 
usurped, claimed, perhaps invented voices, no longer among authentic 
participants. 
• Speaking as representatives of others: individuals, organizations, 
movements, or governments. Lawyers represent their clients in court 
mainly because untrained individuals believe they do not have the know-
how to navigate themselves through the legal system. In taking on a case, 
lawyers translate their client's stories into legally valid narratives that a 
court is designed to handle and to which clients are asked to submit in fear 
of failing. In this process, clients become legal categories - plaintiffs, 
defendants, or witnesses- whose roles are circumscribed by being treated 
as their category and forced to respond accordingly. Or, politicians in 
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democratic governments often face the difficult choice between speaking 
their conscience or in the name of the constituencies that elected them. 
The latter has the advantage of giving those with larger constituencies 
more clout and affords them to defer voting until after consulting with 
their constituency. In all of these cases, interactions are constrained by the 
process of representation. Therefore, a parliament is not a place for 
conversations but for institutionalized debates, public posturing, behind 
door negotiations, compromises, and voting in the name of absent others. 
• Speaking as occupants of an office. In social organizations, members are 
assigned to offices that serve particular functions with responsibilities for 
coordinating the work of subordinates. Occupants of an office dedicate all 
communications to the purpose of that office, speak from that position, 
not for themselves, and expect all subordinates to be accountable to them, 
without challenging their position. The transitivity of such asymmetrical 
accounting practices creates and maintains organizational hierarchies, such 
as in business, government, the military, and even the Catholic Church. 
Office holders are not addressed as individuals, as would be expected in 
conversations, but as part of a hierarchy of which that office is a part. Such 
hierarchies tend to be described in terms of power relations. Through such 
transitively unequal accounting practices, intra-organizational interactions 
are coordinated and directed towards organizational goals. Thus, 
organizational communication deviates markedly from the mutual 
accountability in conversations and therefore deserves special attention. In 
the social sciences, that attention largely comes from sociology, which 
rarely acknowledges how organizational realities are reconstituted by 
actors (Krippendorff, 2008b) and maintained in communication. 
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Discourse as constrained conversation 
To me discourse is what conversations can become when untoward 
conversational moves are not accounted for or repaired. Discourse surfaces 
when interactions become systematized, organized, institutionalized, and no 
longer open to everything its participants may have to say; when dialogical 
equality is replaced by asymmetrical communications; when the insistence on 
consistencies constrains the possibilities that authentic conversations afford 
their participants; and when self-organization (communicational closure) is 
replaced by hierarchies of asymmetrical accounting practices outside the 
present interactions. Elsewhere, I have written about 'discourse as 
systematically constrained conversation' (Krippendorff, 2009:217-236) from 
which I can outline here only its principal features. 
To be clear, when saying that conversation descends, degenerates, or 
erodes into discourse, I do not wish to imply that discourse is an undesirable 
form of languaging. We know many discourses that have made contemporary 
society more livable. We have reasons to be proud of scientific discourse, 
public discourse, legal discourse, design discourse, and the discourse of 
cybernetics (Krippendorff, 2008c), to name but a few. While these discourses 
can be enormously productive, I do suggest that conversations open spaces for 
people to realize each other as human beings, that conversational 
competencies precede discursive practices developmentally (children need to 
acquire conversational competencies before becoming competent in a 
particular discourse), etymologically (the vocabularies of discourses tend to go 
back to generations of speakers), and epistemologically (personal experiences 
that enter conversations may become displaced by discursive constructions of 
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reality). Therefore conversation should not be ignored when theorizing human 
communication in general and human participation in social organizations 
(Krippendorff, 2008b), science, and culture, in particular. 
According to earlier distinctions, the five constitutive features of discourse are: 
• Discourses surface in the artifacts they construct, including the body of 
their texts. The discourse of physics constructs a logically consistent 
universe amenable to observation and causal explanations, that of 
medicine, diseased or debilitated human bodies open to cures or surgical 
interventions, that of design, future technologies of everyday life. 
Discourse-specific vocabularies are standardized building blocks for 
constructing such artifacts. The body of artifacts that a discourse attends 
to needs to remain open to rearticulation, recombination, and creative 
extensions, or else the discourse dies for lack of space. Traditional 
discourse analysts limit their attention to available texts. I maintain this to 
be insufficient. Texts are read and embedded in talk among particular 
people and acted upon. The artifacts that discourses generate include all of 
their visible and somewhat enduring manifestations, not just texts but also 
discourse-specific universes, professional practices, and technologies. 
These artifacts are co-constructed in interpersonal interactions, which, 
while inconceivable without individual cognition are not intelligible in 
terms of cognitive processes. 
However, unlike the traditional emphasis of discourse analysis, these artifacts 
alone are not sufficient for understanding the operation of a discourse, hence 
four additional features of discourse. 
• Discourses are kept alive within a community of their practitioners. Texts 
need to be read, reread, reinterpreted, reconstructed, and updated by 
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members of a discourse community specializing in that practice. Texts have 
no meaning without readers and the artifacts of a discourse are rendered 
meaningful primarily by the members of a discourse community that 
created and used them in their midst as well as by users outside the 
discourse. A discourse community is self-organizing by legitimizing its own 
practices, including creating and maintaining standards for reading, 
writing, interpretation, and construction of their own realities, conditions 
for membership in the discourse community, and criteria for attributing 
meanings to the activities .of its members. For example, the medical 
discourse community trains future members, certifies its practitioners, 
determines codes of conduct and defines the criteria for good medical 
research. All discourse communities are autonomous and pursue their 
distinct identities. 
• Discourses institute their recurrent practices. This is to say that discourse-
specific practices - courses of education, applicable methods and 
techniques, media of publications, awards for outstanding 
accomplishments, etc. - are codified, institutionalized, and maintained as 
the preferred practices of members of the discourse community and 
maintained in the name of that community. Social science publications, for 
example, are carefully evaluated by editors and reviewers, encourage a 
common vocabulary, allow younger members to qualify for promotion, 
and assure the efficiency of constructing discursive artifacts. Theorists 
refer to their predecessors, research methods build on each other, and 
intervention strategies are improved over time - creating a history of its 
practices that avoids duplication of innovations, standardizes methods, 
and thus serves to make the discourse more efficient. 
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• Discourses draw their own boundaries, deciding who and what belongs and 
what does not. Some discourses identify themselves by reference to 
construction of a particular class of artifacts, biologists, for example, are 
concerned with what they construct as living organisms; others are 
committed to apply particular theories, physicists, for example, are 
committed to causal explanations and the construction of a consistent 
universe; still others are dedicated to solve particular problems, 
engineering, for example, seeking technological solutions to all kinds of 
problems, including social ones. 
• Discourses justify their practices to outsiders. Justifications may be 
motivated by the need to continually recruit new members for the 
discourse community to remain viable, mobilize the resources necessary to 
construct their artifacts and promote their use by others. But justifications 
also provide the perhaps unintended ground for driving various discourse 
dynamics. One may note discourses to compete with one another, as 
science and religion did until the discourse of religion found a niche that 
resists scientific penetration. Some discourses consider themselves 
foundationalist, like physics claiming that everything real is physical in 
nature and everything else is inferior science or fiction. Some discourses 
colonize others as cognitive science has been doing lately to psychology. 
Computation 
If discourse emerges when constraints on authentic conversation are 
naturalized, talk becomes institutionalized, unequal accounting practices are 
accepted and channeled into the construction of discursive artifacts; then the 
implementation of technological solutions of social problems or the 
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replacement of social practices by more efficient mechanism can be 
considered a move from discourse to the entirely non-linguistic processes of 
computation. Today, we are witnessing the massive translation of discursive 
practices into efficient computational mechanism: delegating repetitive work 
to robotic devices, searching by search engines for relevant texts on the 
internet, scheduling airplane traffic, letting computers buy and sell stocks, 
online accounting for the essential variables of social organizations, and 
automating whole businesses. In the same way, statistical software in the 
social sciences has replaced seemingly endless and error prone hand 
calculations by teams of researchers, and electronic banking accomplishes 
what a social network of coordinated bank employees did before the advent of 
computers. These replacements are driven by the increasing availability of 
software, discursively developed by armies of collaborating programmers. 
Software is written in a computer language and explicates algorithms, 
i.e., step-by-step instructions in which all conceivable paths are anticipated 
and by means of which receptive hardware can be programmed to be a 
purposefully functioning machine. Much like in discourse, where it does not 
matter who practices it as long as someone does, computation is not tied to 
particular material manifestations as long as it works. In other words, the 
material makeup of hardware is irrelevant to its proceeding from state to state 
in a determinist fashion. Hence, software specifies a deterministic process, 
rendering computers deterministic machines that cannot choose what they do. 
They have no agency. Non-digital technologies - simple tools, cars, hospitals, 
public performances- may not be programmable as are computers, but their 
design has always focused on how they go from here to there, what in the 
digital world is called computation, hence my use of this term. 
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All conversations, discourses, and computations produce something. The 
products of conversations and discourses are still coordinated by talk, text, and 
interactions. Computations, however, once initiated by human actors, run their 
course unless intervened with at their interfaces. People may blindly accept 
the results of computations and allow themselves to be affected by these 
devices, but this is a user's choice, not a necessity. 
Because of the difficulty of grasping the complexities of computational devices, 
we often attribute human qualities to them - intelligence, temperaments, 
likes, and dislikes (Turkle, 1984, 2007; Reeves & Nass, 1996) and the ability to 
act (Latour, 2005). However, such attributions do not change the deterministic 
nature of computational artifacts. One cannot hold computers accountable for 
what they do. Therefore, replacing discursive practices by computational 
technology and relying on them in everyday life amounts to a fundamental 
shift away from human participation. It is truly amazing to realize how many 
discourses depend on digitally mediated communication and computation and 
how little the social sciences have conceptualized this fact of social life or 
confused the two as Latour (2005) does. Here, cybernetics has much to explore 
and many insights to offer. 
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To sum up, Figure 1 depicts a continuum between the extremes of authentic 
conversation and computation, populated by discourse formations of varying 
degrees of rigor. Conversational competencies includes, as I suggested, the 
ability to repair untoward moves that speakers may make, which can bring 
discourses back to conversations and the latter to authentic ones. But by not 
repairing problematic encounters when they occur, by consenting to limited 
accountabili~y for problematic actions, conversations unwittingly drift into 
discursive forms that may well construct realities of a kind that conversations 
cannot - think of sophisticated information systems, highways, and the 
infrastructure of cities. The evolution of such .artifacts is accomplished by 
discourses that coordinate large numbers of human participants, including 
over some time. It follows that social artifacts of such complexity cannot 
possibly be explained by the cognitive constructions by an observer or by any 
one of its participating creators. What participants do know is their own 
creative but always only partial contributions. The remainder consists of trust 
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in the linguistic competence of the other participants to coordinate their 
understanding and interact towards what is to be done. In the transition from 
conversation to discourse, conversational possibilities are traded for practical 
conveniences. In the transition from discourse to computation, seemingly 
costly, unpleasant, or inefficient discursive practices are implemented in 
mechanisms whose ultimate consequences may be difficult to foresee. 
I am suggesting that the move from conversation through the large domain of 
discursive forms is attracted by the ultimate temptation of turning social 
processes into productive algorithms whose operation in various technologies 
is no longer social, except before their inception and subsequently at 
occasional interventions through multi-user interfaces with them. Since 
computational artifacts often are beyond individual understanding of how they 
work, such technologies can no longer be treated as tools under rational 
control of their creators and users. Uncritical reliance on computation can lead 
affected communities into unintended realities that may well become 
unbearable to live in and therefore constitute an important domain of 
scholarly and designerly attention. 
This essay is intended to expand into the domain of the social the kind of 
cognitive constructivism that is confined to individual understanding and make 
less attractive the epistemological position of observers at the expense of 
participatory and interactive reality constructions. I maintain that human 
realities, including the idea of cognition, are conversational or discursive 
realities in the sense that we humans interactively participate in their 
construction - without being in charge or fully cognizant of each other's 
conceptions, except for our contribution to them. 
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1 hope that readers of this essay consider conversation - not individual 
cognition and efforts to describe one's observations- as the essentially human 
way of living together. Following from that is to become aware of the often 
casually accepted drift from conversation through various discursive forms to 
computation. 1 am inviting readers to draw finer distinctions within the domain 
of discourses and reflect on how their own contributions affect the spaces left 
to exercise accountability along this sometimes appealing journey. Although 
computation deserves more attention than I could devote here, it should be 
recognizable as what early cybernetics thrived on and proposed in the form of 
theories, models, and mechanisms for augmenting social reality. Computation 
undoubtedly can vastly expand the horizon of our abilities, but it can also 
constrain human agency. When moving through various discourses, converting 
recurrent social practices into computational artifacts, we should always 
preserve the possibility of returning to authentic conversation, its sheer 
pleasure and fundamental humanness. 
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